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ABSTRACT
Public officials often impose eligibility requirements for
government programs that have two effects: (1) They screen out
ineligible people and (2) they screen out eligible people. Consisting of
paperwork requirements, interviews, waiting periods, and
administrative burdens, such requirements are sometimes
characterized as “sludge,” and for some eligible people, they might
prove overwhelming or prohibitive. In these circumstances, there is a
pervasive normative issue: What is the optimal tradeoff between the
screening out of ineligible people and the screening out of eligible
people? It is plausible to think that a great deal depends on numbers.
If, for example, the number of ineligible people who are screened out
is very large, and if the number of eligible people who are screened out
is very small, then there would seem little ground for objection. But if
the number of eligible people who are screened out is very large, there
is a serious problem, and it might be worthwhile to consider an
approach that would not screen out eligible people, even if it would
simultaneously fail to screen out, or effectively “screen in,” a small
number of ineligible people. We identify competing, plausible positions
on the normative question, which we label consequentialist (in the sense
that they attempt an assessment of the consequences of alternatives
approaches, with a focus on numbers) and legalist (in the sense that
they emphasize legal constraints, designed to ensure that benefits go
only to those who are actually eligible). We also offer the results of a
pilot study, which shows that the overwhelming majority of
respondents would favor changes that allow ineligible people to receive
benefits, if that is the price of ensuring that eligible people do so as
well—unless the number of ineligible recipients is very high. The survey
results suggest that most people reject the legalist position and embrace
a form of consequentialism. We suggest that in light of the normative
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analysis and the survey results, a form of consequentialism is best,
unless the law explicitly forbids it.

I. A DILEMMA
All over the world, governments face a pervasive dilemma with
respect to eligibility requirements. A primary purpose of such
requirements is to ensure that benefits go only to people who are
actually eligible for them. But if the requirements are onerous, then
many people who are eligible will not get them, simply because of that
onerousness. 1 Here, then, is the dilemma: more onerous requirements
will reduce the likelihood that ineligible people will get benefits, while
also increasing the likelihood that eligible people will not get benefits.
Such eligibility requirements are sometimes described as
“sludge,” defined as frictions, paperwork burdens, waiting time,
interview requirements, or other administrative burdens that make it
more difficult for people to obtain benefits. 2 If, for example, people are
required to fill out forms to obtain a visa, to get financial aid, or to
obtain an occupational license, they are facing sludge. If they must go
to an in-person interview before obtaining aid of one or another kind,
sludge is also involved. Many federal and state programs are pervaded
by sludge. 3 But how much sludge is too much? On this definition, it
should be clear that the optimal level is not zero. Some sludge is good
or even essential. Above all, some sludge is necessary to ensure that
resources or opportunities do not go to people who are ineligible for
them. Indeed, some sludge might be legally mandatory.
For many programs, an underlying goal of administrative burdens
is to ensure “program integrity,” 4 meant to refer to an absence of fraud,
1. For examples, see Cass R. Sunstein, Sludge and Ordeals, 68 DUKE L.J. 1843, 1849–51
(2019).
2. See id. (“The term should be taken to refer to the kind of friction, large or small, that
people face when they want to go in one or another direction.”); Richard Thaler, Nudge, Not
Sludge, 361 SCIENCE 431, 431 (Aug. 3, 2018), https://science.sciencemag.org/content/sci/361/6401/
431.full.pdf [https://perma.cc/J3VW-JJG4] (“But what about activities that are essentially nudging
for evil? This ‘sludge’ just mucks things up and makes wise decision-making and prosocial activity
more difficult.”). See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, SLUDGE (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript on
file with authors).
3. See Sunstein, supra note 1, at 1862–64 (noting sludge in Obamacare and Medicare, as
well as state regulations concerning abortion and voter registration).
4. See Protecting Americans from Tax Hikes (PATH) Act, Pub. L. No. 114-113, tit. II, 129
Stat. 2242, 3076–86 (2015) (referring to Title II as “Program Integrity” and specifically intending
to reduce fraudulent and improper payments in the EITC and other programs); Leslie Book,
David Williams & Krista Holub, Insights from Behavioral Economics Can Improve
Administration of the EITC, 37 VA. TAX REV. 177, 180 (2018) (noting that “[p]rogram integrity”
of the EITC was an important topic among employees of the IRS because 43 to 50 percent of all
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abuse, misuse, or access by the ineligible; sludge might be necessary for
that purpose. A large amount of sludge—paperwork burdens, delays,
information collection—could be an essential way to limit benefits,
including taxpayer money, to those who have a legal right to them. Of
course it is also true that sludge might be a covert (or at least not readily
visible) way to limit expenditures; a reflection of a compromise
between those who like a benefits program and those who do not much
like it; or a way for the government to acquire information that could
be used for multiple purposes. 5 But program integrity is often the
central motivation. 6
As a case in point, consider the Earned Income Tax Credit
(“EITC”), 7 a wage subsidy for low-income workers, provided by the
Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”). 8 For the EITC, the take-up rate is
about 80 percent. 9 By the standards of most benefits programs, that
number is not especially low. But if 20 percent of eligible people are
not receiving a potentially life-changing benefit, and if the reason is the
degree of sludge, there is a serious problem. An approach that denies
such a benefit to millions of people surely should be rethought. The
existing amount of sludge would seem excessive, and it should be
reduced.
The IRS almost certainly knows enough to enroll people
automatically and send a refund to eligible taxpayers. If so, sludge
could be eliminated entirely, and the take-up rate should be close to
100 percent. Is that what the IRS should be doing? 10 Suppose that the
EITC returns are incorrect, with most errors benefitting claimants); Program Integrity, CTRS. FOR
MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., https://www.medicaid.gov/medicaid/program-integrity/
index.html [https://perma.cc/2ZMC-XTSH] (explaining CMS responsibilities and goals under the
Medicaid Integrity Program); Reducing Improper Payments, SOC. SEC. ADMIN.,
https://www.ssa.gov/improperpayments [https://perma.cc/T8ZN-XA32]
(emphasizing
the
objective of curbing improper payments).
5. See Sunstein, supra note 1, at 1870–71 (pointing to sludge as a way to ration resources
for those willing to tolerate administrative burdens); id. at 1872 (noting how certain administrative
burdens help agencies collect useful data on public programs like employment training or
infectious disease prevention efforts).
6. See id. at 1865 (noting agencies impose paperwork burdens to ensure programs comply
with the law).
7. The details and requirements of the EITC are set out in 26 U.S.C. § 32 (2018).
8. See PAMELA HERD & DONALD P. MOYNIHAN, ADMINISTRATIVE BURDEN:
POLICYMAKING BY OTHER MEANS 191, 193 (2019). For a general discussion of the EITC and its
effects on recipients, see generally MAKING WORK PAY: THE EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT
AND ITS IMPACT ON AMERICA’S FAMILIES (Bruce D. Meyer & Douglas Holtz-Eakin eds., 2001).
9. HERD & MOYNIHAN, supra note 8, at 191.
10. Surprisingly, there appears to be a lack of substantial literature on automatic enrollment
and the EITC. But see Vada Waters Lindsey, Encouraging Savings Under the Earned Income Tax
Credit: A Nudge in the Right Direction, 44 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 83, 112–21 (2010) (arguing that
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IRS indeed decided to send the EITC automatically to apparently
eligible taxpayers. If it could do so at low cost, and if the apparently
eligible taxpayers are in fact eligible, there would seem to be little
ground for objection. The problem, of course, is the phrase “apparently
eligible taxpayers.” It is possible that some of the recipients, under
automatic enrollment, will not in fact be eligible. Whenever people are
automatically enrolled in a program, some of them may not meet the
legal criteria.
Or consider the question of voting rights. With respect to both
registration and voting, some states impose a degree of sludge, on the
articulated ground that it is necessary to ensure that ineligible people
do not end up voting. 11 But what if the result is also, and
simultaneously, to discourage eligible people from voting? 12 What if
sludge operates as a mechanism for voter suppression? That problem
is pervasive. 13 For benefits programs of multiple kinds, sludge might be
justified as a way of ensuring that ineligible people do not gain access
to goods or opportunities; but the consequence might be to screen out
the eligible as well. If people have to navigate sludge to exercise their
constitutional rights, there seems to be a serious problem.
The remainder of this Essay is organized as follows. Part II
explores the question of optimal sludge as a matter of principle. It
shows that if we care about consequences, we might favor sludge
reduction even if the consequence is to give benefits or opportunities
to people who are ineligible. But if we want to insist on strict adherence
to legal requirements, the grant of benefits to ineligible individuals is
far worse than the denial of benefits, through sludge, to eligible
individuals. Some statutes may, in fact, require sludge even if the
overall consequences are plausibly described as very bad. Part III
describes our survey, which found that most people embrace a form of
consequentialism and firmly reject legalism. Part III also discusses
differences along the lines of party affiliation and demographics;
surprisingly, the survey found only modest differences along these

the EITC should have a retirement savings component with automatic enrollment). This area
deserves sustained study.
11. See HERD & MOYNIHAN, supra note 8, at 47–79 (discussing the history of administrative
burdens in the exercise of voting rights).
12. See, e.g., id. at 56–57 (noting a survey among registered Texas voters found 6 percent of
eligible voters said not having proper identification was “the primary reason they did not vote,”
despite the interviewers finding that the “vast majority” did in fact have proper identification).
13. Id. at 49; see also Vote Suppression, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST.,
https://www.brennancenter.org/issues/ensure-every-american-can-vote/vote-suppression
[https://perma.cc/9LBC-W3QD].
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lines. Part IV, a brief conclusion, argues in favor of sludge reduction on
consequentialist grounds, even if the result is to give some benefits or
opportunities to ineligible people.
II. NORMATIVE ISSUES
Public officials must often choose between (1) a design ensuring
that a certain number of eligible people will not receive a benefit and
(2) a design ensuring that a certain number of ineligible people will
receive a benefit. That may not be an easy choice, and it may not even
be easy to decide on the criteria that officials should use to make it. On
one view, we should focus on consequences, which means that we
should try to specify relevant numbers: How many eligible people
would obtain benefits to which they are entitled? How many ineligible
people would obtain benefits to which they are not entitled? On
another view, we should focus on the underlying statute and the class
of people that it seeks to benefit, certainly if it mandates a particular
conclusion, and perhaps even if it does not.
A. Consequences and Consequentialism
If the idea of program integrity is meant to refer to the number of
errors, the choice between view (1) and view (2) above might turn on
some kind of arithmetic. Which group is larger? If automatic
enrollment means that 500,000 eligible people will receive a benefit
who otherwise would not, but 499,999 ineligible people will also receive
a benefit who otherwise would not, automatic enrollment is justified.
Call this a consequentialist position; it is consequentialist in the sense
that it assesses the optimal level of sludge by focusing on its
consequences.
To be sure, the consequentialist position might be specified in
different ways, and a simple count might be too crude. It could be
challenged from multiple points of view. Suppose that automatic
enrollment gives benefits to 200,000 eligible people but also to 200,100
ineligible people. Some people might think that if the 200,100 people
are nearly eligible—if they are relatively poor—it is not so terrible if
they receive some economic help. But other people might insist that
taxpayer money is accompanied by clear restrictions and argue that if
it is given out in violation of those restrictions, a grievous wrong has
been committed. They might think that if automatic enrollment gives
benefits to 200,000 eligible people but also to 125,000 ineligible people,
it is a terrible idea. On consequentialist grounds, reasonable people
could differ about the appropriate tradeoff; they may or may not
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require a significant disparity between the size of the group of
benefited eligible persons and the size of the group of benefited
ineligible persons.
We might agree that if sludge reduction or automatic enrollment
ensures that a very large number of eligible people receive benefits
who otherwise would not, and that a very small number of ineligible
people also receive benefits who otherwise would not, all is well.
Perhaps we could even agree that if sludge reduction or automatic
enrollment ensures that a large number of eligible people receive
benefits who otherwise would not, and that a significant number of
ineligible people receive benefits who otherwise would not, all is still
well. For example, in the context of COVID-19, the U.S. government
eliminated a great deal of sludge to promote delivery of health and
economic benefits. 14 Even if those steps ultimately rewarded many
people who were not in fact eligible, including people who were no
longer alive, 15 perhaps they were nonetheless justified. But reasonable
people can disagree about these questions. 16
14. Specifically, the stimulus checks set out under the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and
Economic Security (“CARES”) Act , Pub. L. No. 116-136, § 2201, 134 Stat. 281, 335 (2020),
provide a good gauge of public sentiment regarding sludge in emergency scenarios. There were
certainly concerned voices regarding the distribution of stimulus checks to deceased individuals
as well as the living, but the speed at which the Treasury Department sent out the checks may
have justified this oversight. See Erica Werner, Treasury Sent More than 1 Million Coronavirus
Stimulus Payments to Dead People, Congressional Watchdog Finds, WASH. POST (June 25, 2020,
8:09
PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/us-policy/2020/06/25/irs-stimulus-checks-deadpeople-gao [https://perma.cc/529D-5XXQ]; Eric Levitz, Treasury Sent $1.4 Billion in Stimulus
Checks to Dead People. That’s Good, N.Y. MAG: INTELLIGENCER (June 25, 2020),
https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2020/06/irs-coronavirus-stimulus-checks-dead-people-gao.html
[https://perma.cc/4AX7-TD3Z]. In fact, greater frustration was likely caused by the fact that while
the dead received $1.4 billion in stimulus, tens of millions of living Americans did not see their
checks at all. See Savannah Levins, Still No Stimulus Check? You’re Not Alone, WCNC (June 23,
2020, 11:59 AM), https://www.wcnc.com/article/money/still-no-stimulus-check-youre-notalone/275-11793c79-7fb7-4201-9f42-343b6d602397 [https://perma.cc/CWJ8-J3JZ] (noting that 35
million Americans still had not received their stimulus checks as of June 2020).
15. See Werner, supra note 14 (describing how the Treasury Department and IRS
mistakenly disbursed stimulus checks to almost 1.1 million dead people in the rush to quickly
deliver payments).
16. Compare John Kennedy, Sending Coronavirus Payments to Ghosts Hurts the Living,
HILL (May 7, 2020, 2:00 PM), https://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/politics/496615-sendingcoronavirus-payments-to-ghosts-hurts-the-living [https://perma.cc/6G7C-F5QS] (“Even under
normal circumstances, we should not tolerate this level of waste and incompetence, but COVID19 has landed us far from normal times. . . . Even the most fiscally unfettered politician can’t
justify cutting checks to people who are not even alive.”), with Levitz, supra note 14 (“The
program had an error rate of roughly 0.4 percent. That is not a scandal. It is a triumph.”), and
Cindy Carcamo, Why Are the Dead Getting Coronavirus Stimulus Checks?, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 24,
2020, 5:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2020-04-24/coronavirus-stimuluscheck-death-payment [https://perma.cc/3RPB-UF3D] (quoting a former head of an IRS
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As usual, consequentialists need to specify what matters, so that
we can know what counts as a good or bad consequence, and how good
or bad it is. We should be able to agree that it is good, and often very
good, to ensure that eligible people receive benefits to which they are
entitled (especially if they are poor or sick). But how bad is it, exactly,
if ineligible people receive such benefits as well?
That question remains to be answered; consequentialism, in the
abstract, cannot do so. In terms of drawing the right conclusion, we will
also want to specify the substantive area that is involved. More or less
sludge might be imposed and tolerated in such diverse domains as
antipoverty programs, voting, abortion, student visas, and occupational
licenses. 17 In one area, reasonable consequentialists might be willing to
accept a grant of a good or opportunity to a large number of ineligibles,
without also committing themselves to the same level of toleration in
another area.
B. Legalism
On an alternative view, even a modest breach of program
integrity, for the advantage of those who are not eligible, is
unacceptable. Call this the legalist position. It is legalist in the sense
that it sees a violation of legal requirements as a serious breach, one
that cannot be justified on consequentialist grounds. An extreme
version of the legalist position would be that a grant of benefits to a
very large number of eligible people would not outweigh the grant of
benefits to a very small number of ineligible people.
We need to make a distinction here. Suppose that the law is
conclusive on the question. Suppose that properly read, it mandates a
degree of sludge. Or suppose that it forbids officials from taking steps
to provide benefits to small numbers of ineligible people, even if those
steps are necessary to ensure that benefits go to large numbers of
eligible people. If so, the law is conclusive. Officials have no room to
maneuver; they are strictly bound. Call this mandatory legalism. If a
statute prohibits approaches that would allow ineligible people to
receive benefits, the legal question is at an end, and consequentialism
is off-limits.

watchdog group noting that “[t]he IRS is following the law,” as well as a vice president of
conservative think tank that “[e]xpediency has been prioritized,” rather than delaying checks for
weeks and months by cross-referencing data to eliminate dead recipients).
17. See Sunstein, supra note 1, at 1850–52; see generally HERD & MOYNIHAN, supra note 8
(discussing administrative burdens in a wide variety of policy arenas).
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But suppose, alternatively, that the law gives officials discretion to
adopt various approaches, such that they can choose an approach that
inadvertently but inevitably grants benefits to ineligibles without
violating any statutory provision, if that is the price of giving benefits
to more eligible individuals. For example, a statute involving voter
registration might authorize states to adopt registration procedures
that do not entirely screen out people who are ineligible. Or a statute
providing free school meals for poor children might come with a
general appropriation and give authority to state agencies to ascertain
how best to ensure receipt by those who are eligible—authority that
might include a license to make some mistakes. 18 But some people
might say that officials should not take this approach, even if they have
the legal authority to do so, because it is a grievous wrong to use one’s
discretion to give benefits to ineligibles. Call this discretionary
legalism.
In principle, mandatory legalism is right, if the statute really is
conclusive. But in principle, extreme versions of discretionary
legalism—where, it will be recalled, the statute is not conclusive—
would seem hard to defend: a grant of benefits to ten people who are
almost (but not) eligible would appear to be a price worth paying in
exchange for a grant of benefits to two million people who are in fact
eligible. But granting benefits in violation of the law is no light thing,
even if officials do have some discretion under the statute, and the
correct tradeoff is not self-evident. Public officials encounter the
problem frequently, and so do companies, universities, nonprofits,
homeless shelters, hospitals, and others. It is a general truth that as the
burdens of eligibility requirements increase, the class of people who
receive a benefit may well include fewer ineligibles; and as those
burdens loosen, there is an ever-growing risk that a benefit will go to
people who should not be getting it.

18. For example, the Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008 provides a general
appropriation to states for the administration of the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program
(“SNAP”), but states are allowed to determine the best means of certifying which children are
eligible for free school meals. See Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110234, §§ 4111–22, 122 Stat. 923, 1102–13; see generally U.S. Dep’t of Agric., DIRECT
CERTIFICATION IN THE NATIONAL SCHOOL LUNCH PROGRAM: : STATE IMPLEMENTATION
PROGRESS REPORT TO CONGRESS—SCHOOL YEAR 2015–2016 AND 2016–2017 (2018),
https://www.fns.usda.gov/sites/default/files/resource-files/NSLPDirectCertification2016.pdf
[https://perma.cc/QBV5-24TF] (reporting to Congress “on State progress in direct certification in
the National School Lunch Program”).
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III. A PILOT SURVEY
We could imagine theoretical debates about these questions, and
they would undoubtedly allow us to make progress. But let us now turn
to an empirical question: What do people actually think about these
issues? In a democracy, public officials are attentive to what members
of the public think, and if most people turn out to favor an identifiable
form of consequentialism, or instead embrace a form of legalism, their
judgment would certainly be of interest. And for those who believe in
“the wisdom of crowds,” a widespread public judgment might also have
epistemic value. It might tell us something about what is right.
We do not mean to say that the results of surveys should be taken
to be decisive. Suppose that under the law, agencies have no statutory
authority to give out benefits to people who are not eligible, even if a
sludge-reduction strategy, producing that result, is the only way to
ensure that benefits are received by a very large number of eligible
people. Even if people approve of that result on consequentialist
grounds, it is by hypothesis unlawful. Or suppose that some form of
discretionary legalism is correct; those who embrace it would be
unlikely to change their stance upon learning that, in surveys, most
people disagree with them. Or suppose that some form of
consequentialism is consistent with law and also can be shown to
benefit a very large number of people. Should we reject it because most
people do so in surveys? Committed consequentialists would not be
willing to do so. They might insist that survey answers do not show
informed or reflective thinking, and that their own approach is
preferable in principle.
For these reasons, we do not suggest or believe that, for
democratic reasons, the views elicited in surveys should be taken as
decisive. But they are of unquestionable interest. At a minimum, public
officials, when deciding what to do, will be attuned to whether the
public embraces or rejects one or another position. Surveys are
informative about that question.
With that point in mind, we conducted a pilot survey in which we
attempted to elicit people’s views on the underlying questions in one
substantive domain. We emphasize the word “pilot”; this was meant as
a preliminary effort to obtain a sense of what people think. Using
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk, we asked 407 people to consider four
different scenarios, specifying different numbers of ineligible people
who would receive EITC benefits under automatic enrollment. The
survey was not nationally representative, but it did have a high degree
of diversity. The participants were 60 percent male, 40 percent female;

2020]

OPTIMAL SLUDGE

83

30 percent Republican, 43 percent Democratic, 27 percent
independent (that is, unassociated voters); 68 percent White, 14
percent Asian, 7 percent Black, 4 percent Hispanic. We chose a withinsubjects design, in which all subjects saw all four scenarios, with the
goal of promoting comparative assessments.
We described four scenarios, reprinted below, and then asked the
survey participants a simple question: whether they would approve of
what we described as a “new approach” to the distribution of the EITC,
which would have varying consequences. (Participants were asked a
binary question: approve or disapprove.) The actual text read as
follows:
(1) Under the new approach, the IRS would give the Earned
Income Tax Credit only to the 4 million people who are actually
eligible; no one would receive it who is not eligible.
(2) The IRS would inevitably make mistakes, and it would send out
some money to people who are not, in fact, eligible for the
Earned Income Tax Credit. Under the new approach, 4 million
people would receive the credit who would otherwise not get it.
Of those, 3.98 million are eligible, but 20,000 are not.
(3) The IRS would inevitably make mistakes, and it would send out
some money to people who are not, in fact, eligible for the
Earned Income Tax Credit. Under the new approach, 4 million
people would receive the credit who would otherwise not get it.
Of those, 3.9 million are eligible, but 100,000 are not.
(4) The IRS would inevitably make mistakes, and it would send out
some money to people who are not, in fact, eligible for the
Earned Income Tax Credit. Under the new approach, 4 million
people would receive the credit who would otherwise not get it.
Of those, 3.5 million are eligible, but 500,000 are not.

The aggregate results were straightforward. Very strong
majorities approved of automatic enrollment in scenarios (1) and (2);
a solid majority approved of automatic enrollment in scenario (3); and
a solid majority rejected it in scenario (4). In short, most people
rejected a legalist approach to these questions, in favor of a form of
consequentialism. Even if 100,000 people would receive benefits to
which they were not entitled, people would favor automatic
enrollment. And when as many as 500,000 ineligible people would
receive benefits, a substantial minority would nonetheless approve. It
is noteworthy, however, that with those numbers, the majority
disapproved, demonstrating that in scenario (4), many
consequentialists would draw the line.
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More specifically: For scenario (1), the approval rate was 89
percent, with Democrats at 91 percent, independents at 90 percent, and
Republicans at 85 percent. For scenario (2), the approval rate was 75
percent, with Democrats at 84 percent, independents at 74 percent, and
Republicans at 62 percent. For scenario (3), the approval rate was 61
percent, with Democrats at 74 percent, independents at 54 percent, and
Republicans at 50 percent. Lastly, for scenario (4), the approval rate
was 44 percent, with Democrats at 49 percent, independents at 37
percent, and Republicans at 42 percent.
Figure 1. Approval Rates by Political Affiliation
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%

Scenario (1)
Overall

Scenario (2)
Democrats

Scenario (3)

Independents

Scenario (4)

Republicans

We expected to find significant differences across various lines,
but in testing for statistical significance, we were surprised to find few
differences along almost every line that we tested. 19 In particular, we
anticipated much higher approval ratings from Democrats rather than
from Republicans, but even there, the picture is complicated, for the
differences were less than stark. To be sure, there were significant
differences between Republicans and Democrats in scenarios (2) and
(3). Note, however, that the differences between the two parties is not
statistically significant for scenarios (1) and (4), which makes it
hazardous to say that we have found a consistent difference, on these
issues, along party lines. In these circumstances, the relatively high
19.

For further details, see infra app.
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level of agreement among Democrats, independents, and Republicans
is the main story.
Analysis of a range of demographic differences also failed to find
significant differences, perhaps because of the relatively small sample
sizes. Surprisingly, we were unable to find differences between men
and women or along lines of race or educational attainment. The few
significant differences that we did find tell no clear or obvious tale, and
we would not make much of them. For example, we found a statistically
significant result for those in the $120,000–$149,999 salary range in
scenarios (3) and (4): those in this income category (the second
highest) showed lower approval ratings than did people in other
income categories. With respect to age, we found that 50–64-year-olds
showed a significantly lower approval rate in scenario (3), and those 65
and over showed a significantly lower approval rate in scenario (1).
Because these findings seem a bit random, and do not show
differences across all four scenarios, it would be hazardous to draw
general lessons from them. The important story is shown by the
aggregate data, and by the significant, but relatively modest,
differences between Republicans and Democrats in scenarios (2) and
(3).
CONCLUSION
There has been growing attention to administrative burdens and
sludge, with a mounting awareness that many eligible people are
deterred or prevented from obtaining benefits or opportunities to
which they are legally entitled. The strongest justification for such
burdens is that they are necessary to screen out ineligible people.
Whether this is an adequate justification depends on whether we
embrace consequentialism, mandatory legalism, or discretionary
legalism, and how we specify each of these approaches.
In principle, and if the law permits it, we would argue in favor of
a form of consequentialism. Suppose that a sludge-reduction approach
ensures that a very large number of eligible people receive an economic
benefit who otherwise would not, while also ensuring that a very small
number of ineligible people also end up with that benefit. The details
matter, but in general, we would favor that approach. We would also
be willing to embrace consequentialism even if the numbers were not
so overwhelmingly supportive of sludge reduction. But we do not mean
here to take a specific stand on what consequentialism entails, or about
the appropriate conclusions when particular numbers are presented.
The
substantive
area
undoubtedly
matters.
Reasonable
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consequentialists might offer different conclusions in the domains of
antipoverty programs, voting, abortion, student visas, and occupational
licenses. In one area, they might tolerate a grant of a good or
opportunity to ineligibles, without also committing themselves to the
same level of toleration in another area.
In the particular domain of the EITC, a pilot survey suggests that
most people embrace consequentialism, and that they are willing to
accept the grant of benefits to numerous ineligible people if that is the
price of granting benefits to far more numerous eligible people. It
appears that people will accept automatic enrollment unless it means
that benefits are also granted to an extraordinarily high number of
ineligible people.
A great deal of research remains to be done. In the future, it would
be valuable to probe the normative and legal issues in more detail.
Recall mandatory legalism and suppose that a form of
consequentialism would result in a violation of relevant statutes—
perhaps because it would unlawfully grant economic benefits to
ineligible people. If so, that approach should not be adopted. But how
many and which statutes are best understood in this way? How many
and which statutes should alternatively be understood to give agencies
discretion to take sludge-reducing steps that admittedly give out
benefits to people who are not eligible? It would be most valuable to
obtain answers to these questions.
It would also be valuable to obtain a more comprehensive
understanding of what people think in different areas, and to explore
whether there are differences along political or demographic lines. Our
own study is a mere pilot in this domain, with a relatively small sample.
We could do far more to probe what people actually think. Even now,
however, we believe that a heavy burden of justification lies on those
who would reject effective sludge-reduction efforts, including
automatic enrollment, even if the unintended but inevitable
consequence would be to benefit some or even many people who are
not in fact eligible. So long as sludge-reduction efforts are consistent
with law and basic principle, the survey results here would suggest that
those efforts deserve support, at least if they are necessary to ensure
that large numbers of eligible people receive potentially life-changing
or life-saving benefits that they would not otherwise receive.
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APPENDIX

Table 1. This table reports the results of the survey discussed in
the text. More specifically, it reports the approval ratings for each
demographic group with respect to the four scenarios. Recall that in
these scenarios, the IRS gives the EITC to 4 million people:
(1) All of whom are actually eligible for the EITC;
(2) 3.98 million of whom are eligible, but 20,000 are not eligible
for the EITC;
(3) 3.9 million of whom are eligible, but 100,000 are not eligible
for the EITC; or
(4) 3.5 million of whom are eligible, but 500,000 are not eligible
for the EITC.
CATEGORY
TOTAL
APPROVAL RATE
GENDER
Male
Female
PARTY ID
Democrat
Republican
Independent
EDUCATION
< High School
High School / GED
Some College
Bachelor’s Degree
Master’s Degree
Professional
Degree
Doctoral Degree
RACE
Asian
Black

APPROVAL RATINGS OF SCENARIOS
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
89%

75%

61%

44%

88%
90%

76%
73%

65%
57%

47%
39%

91%
85%
90%

84%
62%
74%

74%
50%
54%

49%
42%
37%

100%
86%
88%
89%
92%

100%
86%
72%
72%
81%

0%
79%
53%
60%
69%

0%
59%
38%
42%
55%

90%

80%

70%

30%

100%

50%

75%

50%

93%
90%

81%
72%

67%
76%

33%
62%
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Hispanic
Native American
White
More than one
AGE
Under 24 years
25 to 29 years
30 to 49 years
50 to 64 years
65 years and over
INCOME
Less than $30,000
$30,000–$59,999
$60,000_$89,999
$90,000–$119,999
$120,000–$149,999
$150,000 and more
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88%
75%
89%
81%

88%
50%
72%
86%

65%
25%
59%
67%

53%
0%
44%
48%

91%
84%
93%
88%
62%

81%
86%
73%
62%
54%

78%
71%
59%
40%
54%

43%
59%
44%
26%
31%

89%
89%
92%
82%
88%
95%

77%
78%
70%
66%
81%
86%

72%
64%
56%
64%
35%
59%

57%
45%
41%
40%
19%
36%

Figure 2. Significance testing
Exponentiated coefficients; p-values in parentheses
*
**
p < 0.05
p < 0.01 *** p < 0.001
SCENARIOS:
RACE
Asian
Black
Hispanic
Native American
White
More than one
AGE

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

1
(.)
0.620
(0.533)
0.509
(0.426)
0.386
(0.420)
0.876
(0.811)
0.456
(0.292)

1
(.)
0.670
(0.473)
1.759
(0.472)
0.289
(0.256)
0.864
(0.707)
1.368
(0.662)

1
(.)
1.710
(0.329)
1.088
(0.888)
0.273
(0.251)
0.955
(0.892)
1.018
(0.976)

1
(.)
3.209
(0.020)
2.667
(0.091)
0.142
(0.231)
1.761
(0.086)
1.700
(0.328)
*
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Under 24 years
25 to 29 years
30 to 49 years
50 to 64 years
65 years and over
EDUCATION
< High School
High School / GED
Some College
Bachelor’s Degree
Master’s Degree
Professional Degree
Doctoral Degree
GENDER
Female
Male
INCOME
Less than $30,000
$30,000–$59,999
$60,000–$89,999
$90,000–$119,999
$120,000–$149,999
$150,000 and more

1
(.)
0.575
(0.322)
1.438
(0.491)
0.829
(0.765)
0.173
(0.019)

1
(.)
1.577
(0.359)
0.663
(0.306)
0.409
(0.060)
0.394
(0.170)

1
(.)
0.680
(0.376)
0.410
(0.018)
0.206
(0.001)
0.362
(0.131)

1
(.)
1.999
(0.072)
0.898
(0.743)
0.483
(0.100)
0.492
(0.285)

1
(.)
2.086
(0.663)
2.482
(0.578)
2.733
(0.536)
3.802
(0.424)
2.242
(0.660)
5.530
(0.461)

1
(.)
0.676
(0.822)
0.282
(0.450)
0.263
(0.424)
0.465
(0.650)
0.343
(0.554)
0.0609
(0.150)

1
(.)
18.62
(0.089)
4.860
(0.344)
6.077
(0.277)
9.223
(0.185)
11.97
(0.167)
7.021
(0.319)

1
(.)
6.211
(0.271)
2.480
(0.577)
2.576
(0.559)
4.051
(0.391)
1.736
(0.752)
2.496
(0.623)

1
(.)
0.866
(0.672)

1
(.)
1.232
(0.405)

1
(.)
1.430
(0.118)

1
(.)
1.249
(0.311)

1
(.)
1.059
(0.901)
1.646
(0.331)
0.542
(0.236)
0.826
(0.779)
2.256

1
(.)
0.975
(0.945)
0.648
(0.223)
0.452
(0.061)
1.300
(0.646)
1.714

1
(.)
0.726
(0.334)
0.554
(0.076)
0.652
(0.294)
0.246
(0.005)
0.597

1
(.)
0.646
(0.148)
0.548
(0.055)
0.471
(0.046)
0.200
(0.003)
0.414

*

*

***

**

*

**
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PARTY ID
Democrat
Republican
Independent
N

(0.380)

(0.421)

(0.329)

(0.088)

1
(.)
0.572
(0.159)
0.744
(0.485)
407

1
(.)
0.322
(0.000)
0.512
(0.035)
407

1
(.)
0.356
(0.000)
0.391
(0.001)
407

1
(.)
0.766
(0.300)
0.660
(0.119)
407

***

*

***

***

